dience, the Eranos meeting at Ascona.2 Moreover, Scholem himself has pointed out the affinities between the topics dealt with in these two essays.3 Scholem's other references to myth and ritual, will be mentioned in passing, but will remain peripherical for our present discussion. Aware as I am that there are also other discussions by Scholem on issues dealt here, both before and after the writing of these two studies, where Scholem has expressed also different opinions than those discussed here, they represent only tangential treatments of subjects whose ample analysis was offered in these two articles. My choice of these studies as the basis of the following treatment is conditioned by my understanding that these analyses are truly representative of Scholem's ideas. Moreover, as it is my view that a totally coherent theory on the relationship between Rabbinism and Kabbalism cannot be extracted from Scholem's writings I resort to the most complete discussions on this issue. It is the central contention of this study-writes the author6-that the essential factor molding the spiritual world of the Bible, the Apocrypha, Rabbinic literature, and emergent Christianity, was mythical thought and expression.
There can be, and indeed there are, profound disagreements as to the meaning of myth; In our case, one can ask whether the biblical monotheistic myth-is mythical in the sense the pagan polytheistic myths are. Nevertheless, it seems that modern scholarship is nowadays more inclined to accept the mythical essence of some aspects of biblical theology than it was two or three generations ago. 7 In any case, the working definition of myth I adopt for the following discussion is that proposed by Paul Ricoeur:
Myth will here be taken to mean what the history of religion now finds in it: not a false explanation by means of images and fables, but a traditional narration which relates to events that happened at the beginning of time and which has the purpose of providing grounds for the ritual actions of men of today and, in a general manner, establishing all the forms of action and thought by which man understands himself in the world.8
It is the last part of the passage that constitutes, in my opinion, a most contingent starting point for a fruitful discussion of myth in general. When Scholem assumes that the biblical thought is amythical, not to say anti-mythical, he probably understood it in comparison to the pagan mythology of the Near East. However, one of the issues when comparing the "amythical" Bible to the mythical Kabbalism is whether the latter consists in myths that are not found in earlier strata of Judaism, including the Biblical one. From this perspective, the crucial question is whether or not Kabbalah presents myths that have roots in the earlier Jewish thought. In other words, has the Kabbalistic mythologoumena nothing to do with the concerns and practices of previous forms of Judaism?9 A similar incompatibility with myth is postulated by Scholem also in regard to another major stratum of "classical" Judaism. In Rabbinism, he writes, the performance of sacred actions, of ritual, is largely divorced from the substrate that has always been the mother of the ritual, that is, from the myths that are represented in the mime or drama of ritual.10
Postulating an amythical nature as regards the two major stages ofJudaism which preceded the historical manifestations of Kabbalism, Scholem created a profound gap between these two earlier phases of this religion, with which Kabbalah was well acquainted, and even conceived of itself as their legitimate continuator, and Kabbalah. Indeed this "essential" gap between the different layers of Jewish religiosity opened the way to a new dynamics which will explain the transformation of the anti-mythical Judaism into a profoundly mythical one. Scholem set as the major efforts of his scholarly enterprise, the task of explaining the tremendous metamorphosis of the earlier strata of Judaism. In the following, my discussion will be focused on the relationship between Rabbinism, as Scholem puts it, and Kabbalism,"1 the relations between Biblical Judaism and Kabbalah, interesting and crucial as they may be shall not be considered here.
III
In his article on the Kabbalistic ritual, Gershom Scholem remarked that the Rabbinic system was a hypertrophy of ritual, which became all-pervading.. Man, incited by God, dimly and sharply conscious of the obscure pressure of God, responds to him best not by a simple movement of the mind; but by a rich and complex action, in which his whole nature is concerned.'3 The rich and complex action which is understood as the characteristic of worship is quite difficult to define. In the case of Rabbinism it is indeed a very elaborate system of deeds. However, what seems to be crucial is not so much the very multiplication of the actions or their complexity, but the mental attitude which generates them. At least in the way I understand the Talmudic text, it is a response of love which motivates the Halakhah. The passage from the Talmud can be envisioned, as Scholem did, as legalism per se, which multiplies ordinances to the extent of hypertrophy. However, it may reflect an erotic type of spirituality. Let me compare the above-mentioned Talmudic text to another Rabbinic discussion. In a Midrashic passage, the function of the commandments is described as follows:
Israel is beloved! The Bible surrounds them with mitzvot: Tefillin on the head and arm, a mezuzah on the door, zizit on their clothes . . . This may be compared to a king of flesh-and-blood who said to his wife "Adorn yourself with all your jewelry so that you will be desirable to me". So the Blessed Holy One said to Israel: "My children, distinguish yourself with mitzvot so that you will be desirable to Me." '4 In both passages, the significance of the commandments is grounded in the intimate marital relationship which is the basic factor for their multiplication. Indeed someone may argue that what we face here is no more than a rhetoric of love, mere metaphors of marital relationship devoid of any emotional roots. However, such an argument is doubtful as it anticipates the conclusion by positing a preconception as to the dry and sober ritual which cannot express a more deep relationship. On the basis of these Rabbinic texts, it is quite possible that some ancient Rabbis envisioned the wealth of commandments as a treasure, to be performed with a highly emotional intention, whereas other Rabbis would adopt a more legalistic stand. In any case, the above text is open to a much more mythical understanding than that proposed by Scholem.
Moreover, I am not so sure whether it would be more congruent to assume that Kneset Israel is merely a metaphor for the whole people of Israel, or rather a supernal hypostasis whose erotic relationship to God represents, according to the Rabbinic reading of the Song of Songs, the real message of this book. I cannot fully explain here why I propose an hypostatic reading of this passage.'5 In any case, it is rather strange that this Talmudic passage would be used to prove the unqualified hypertrophic nature of the Rabbinic ritual. My reading of the ordinances as expressions related to pure marital relationship seems to be as good as the more sober one offered by Scholem. I wonder why it was necessary to dispense with the biblical prooftext from the Song of Songs in order to leave the impression that the hypertrophy of the ordinances stands in itself, without any specific motivation. In my opinion, Kneset Israel in the above text indeed betrays a rather mythical entity, more than a metaphor for the community of Israel here below. In lieu of the divine consort of the archaic mythology, the God of Israel has chosen as his feminine counterpart a whole people, the people of Israel. This is already alluded to in several prophetic descriptions of the relationship between the people of Israel and God. The feminine genre of the phrase Kneset Israel seems to accentuate the role of the hypostasis which represents the people of Israel. It indicates that Rabbinic thought was more open to the feminine entities than Biblical thought, as the parallel emergence of the term Shekhinah demonstrates.l6 Thus, an ethnic monotheistic myth has substituted the classical cosmic myths characteristic of the ancient Near East. The addition of the feminine entity as a mediator between the actual people of Israel and the remote Deity ratherbridged the gap between the two extremes. In any case, the early occurence of the concepts of an hypostatical Kneset Israel and the Shekhinah, renders Hegel's view of Judaism, as the classical example of a religion of transcendence (which was apparently applied by Scholem to Rabbinism) as an inadequate conception. If the "symbolic function" of myth can be described, in Ricoeur's words, as "its power of discovering and revealing the bond between man and what he considers sacred" then I believe that the above Rabbinic texts reflect a mythical understanding of Jewish ritual. 17 However, it will be a misunderstanding to conceive the Rabbinic ethnic and ethic myths as totally devoided of any cosmic dimension. The Torah, which regulates the relationship between God and His people was conceived to have conspicuous cosmic characteristics, which are obvious in a long series of Aggadic discussions. Although it may be possible to adduce better examples than those offered by Scholem in order to make his point regarding hypertrophy, I remain sceptical as to the viability of the "myth of the sobreity" created by Scholem. Instead, I would prefer the description of the spirituality of legalism proposed by R. Goldenberg:
To live a life of Torah was not only to submit joyfully and lovingly to the "yoke" of a sacred covenant-this too may be said of anyone, or at least of all Israel-it was also to continue the shaping of that covenant, its application to unforeseen circumstances and its extension to new areas of human existence. There is a kind of grateful humility here, but a remarkable assertiveness as well. The innermost heart of the rabbinic religion is the place where these two emotions finally merge into one.18
Against this "background" of the "dry" and "sober" Rabbinic ritual, Scholem emphasizes the attempts of the first Kabbalists to "anchor the ritual of Rabbinic Judaism in myth by means of a mystical practice."19 "Mystical" presumably stands in Scholem for either the theurgical interpretation of the Talmudic requirement to perform the commandments with Kavvanah,20 or intention, or for the communitive significance of the commandments, namely the transformation of the mitzvot into a means for attaining mystical experience. A basic question which Scholem did not address in his abovementioned essay is how the mystical and mythical understandings of the ritual emerge out of a "dry and sober" Rabbinic mentality. Scholem did not entirely ignore the problem. As we shall see below, he has given a detailed answer for it. Nevertheless, when dealing phenomenologically with generic descriptions of Kabbalism versus Rabbinism in the two articles under scrutiny here, he seems to evade this problem.
IV
The sharp antagonism between a Kabbalistic mode of thought motivated by a mythical universe, and the "history-saturated" consciousness of the Rabbinic mind, as Scholem called this type of mentality, is an oversimplification that does not do justice either to the Rabbinic or to the Kabbalistic concepts of myth, ritual, time or history. The dichotomy Scholem proposed is particularly unlikely insofar as it refers to voluminous bodies of literature written over very lengthy periods of time which are described generically. According to this phenomenology, the emergence of Kabbalah constitutes an instant and profound restructuring of Judaism. Theoretically, such a transformation is not impossible; but it is strange that no massive opposition to the allegedly novel form of Judaism is known among Rabbinic authorities. Exactly at the same time, the innovations of Maimonides were bitterly attacked whereas the emergence of the Kabbalah encountered only marginal opposition. In lieu of assuming such a profound contrast between two types of religiosity, (which were often cultivated by one and the same person) it would be better to make use of a more moderate description. Rabbinism was not an homogenuous religiosity; it incorporates diverging views on many issues, including the preference, or the rejection of mythical types of expression. It is therefore quite strange that Scholem implicitly identified Rabbinism exclusively with Halakhah, whereas the 'Aggadah was not included as part of the discussion of the dichotomy RabbinismKabbalism. As he himself has several times remarked, the continuity between the Kabbalistic and the 'Aggadic literature seems to be obvious; indeed, according to Scholem himself, the 'Aggadic literature consists of some mythological elements.21 However, as far as I can determine, Scholem never quoted the scholarship which explicitly related 'Aggadah to specific mythological material.22 It may be mentioned, that there are but few scholars, indeed only very few, who would envision an organic link between 'Aggadah and Halakhah on one side, and a natural link between them and the later medieval mystical-mythical interpretations on the other.23 Hence Scholem's reduction of Rabbinism to Halakhah in those studies we are concerned with here is not only a simplification of Rabbinism, but also an onesided view of Halakhah as devoid of any mystical and mythical implications.
On the other hand it should be noted that alongside the mythical types of Kabbalah there were also anti-mythical, or at least non-mythical forms as well-viz. the ecstatic and the philosophical modes. It seems that the generic, or perhaps, hypostatic attitude to the terms used in the academic inquiry, like Rabbinism, Kabbalism, Gnosticism, myth, Messianism are one of the major stumbling blocks to a more nuanced understanding of the processes which generated the emer- Let me, in conclusion, address the peculiar process of the mythization of the Kabbalah. If the assumption of Scholem was that the Rabbinic ritual could not itself produce its mythical component, then the assumption is that some myths, or "narrative philosophies" as Scholem defined them following Schelling, were introduced into the ritual. I would rather like to contend that the theosophical element, related to the narrative philosophy, was the major technique for anchoring ritual in myth. I would say that it was a deepening of the significance of the ritual, through the attempt to determine the rationales of the commandments that generated the ritual myths. In other words, it can be assumed that the elaboration on some myths was, primarily, not the result of a mythopoeic drive to build up a certain mythical philosophy, but the result of the elaboration on the mythologoumena already in existence in Judaism, which were organized, or re-organized in order to account for the meaning of the commandments. In other words, I contend that a theosophy was not introduced to Judaism from outside, nor was it subsequently, and artificially connected with the commandments, but that an inner process was responsible for the emergence of stronger ritual myths. The effort to elucidate the metaphysical basis for the influence of the performance of the commandments on the divine level was, in my opinion, the main move of the theosophical-theurgical Kabbalah. To put it differently, Scholem maintains that it was basically Gnostic material that informed Jewish mystics in regard to the Kabbalistic myth which is the quintessence of Kabbalistic theosophy. I would rather propose that a specific type of Jewish theurgy, that sought a supernal domain or a superstructure, is essential to explain the daily ritual here. Whereas Scholem minimized the mythical elements in Rabbinism and overemphasized the mythical nature of Kabbalism, I would suggest the possibility that Rabbinism was more mythical than Scholem and his followers would conceive26, and that some parts of the Kabbalah, the ecstatic and the philosophical types, were much less mythical than Scholem 
